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Abstract 
 This	  paper	  examines	  to	  what	  extent	  agency	  rulemaking	  is	  democratic.	  It	  reviews	  theories	  of	  administrative	  rulemaking	  in	  light	  of	  two	  normative	  benchmarks:	  a	  “democratic”	  benchmark	  based	  on	  voter	  preferences,	  and	  a	  “republican”	  benchmark	  based	  on	  the	  preferences	  of	  elected	  representatives.	  It	  then	  evaluates	  how	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  lines	  up	  in	  light	  of	  these	  two	  approaches.	  The	  paper	  concludes	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	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I. Introduction 
 One feature common to all modern democracies is the delegation of substantial 
authority to unelected bureaucrats. For the most part, this regularity is driven by the 
simple fact that the demands of lawmaking in modern society have outstripped the 
institutional capacity of legislatures to craft their own rules (Cox 2006). Legislators do 
not have the time or expertise to fully solve the detailed and complex problems that a 
modern society faces. One important way legislatures have adapted to this shortcoming is 
to delegate to expert administrative agencies rulemaking authority1—the authority to 
make rules that carry the force of law.2  
A more complete theoretical explanation for the regularity of delegation also points to 
incentives created by elections as well as the intertemporal instability of legislative 
coalitions. Some authors argue legislators delegate “difficult” policy choices to agencies, 
thereby claiming credit for “solving” the public policy problem, but avoiding blame for 
any pain that the solution imposes on electorally relevant actors (e.g., Ely 1980, Fiorina 
1982, Schoenbrod 2008). More recent theoretical work, confronting the question of why 
voters do not blame legislators for the act of delegation itself, has stressed that voters, in 
an incomplete information environment, may not know if the delegation occurs for a 
“good” reason (such as agency expertise) or for a “bad” reason (such as corruption), 
creating the space for legislators to delegate for bad reasons without being held 
accountable (Jordan and Fox 2011). Yet another strand of literature argues that delegation 
may occur to allow the government to credibly commit to a course of action (e.g., Rogoff 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although we briefly touch on other countries, our focus throughout is on rulemaking in the U.S. context.  
2 Delegated authority may also come, for example, in the form of the ability to adjudicate disputes between 
parties; although we touch on such alternative forms of delegated authority our focus is on rulemaking. 
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1985) and permit legislators to “insulate” policy from future legislative coalitions which 
may have divergent policy preferences (e.g., Moe 1990, Shepsle and Horn 1989, de 
Figueiredo 2002).  
To give a sense of the magnitude of agency rulemaking, administrative agencies in 
the United States finalized over 2,800 rules in 2013, regulating virtually every corner of 
American life, from air and water quality, to food quality, to automobile and workplace 
safety.3 By comparison, the U.S. Congress produced only 72 public laws during that same 
year. These figures cast into relief a fundamental normative question that has occupied 
scholars since the inception of the administrative state: in what sense can administrative 
rulemaking be “democratic” if we do not elect the individuals writing the rules? 
We view the term “democratic rulemaking” as having three possible frames. The first 
is that democratic rulemaking requires the regulator to be directly elected. Outside of a 
few narrow circumstances, such as state Public Utility Commissions, citizens do not 
directly elect regulators. And this is for good reason. At present there are nearly 200 
federal agencies with rulemaking authority;4 it would be exceptionally difficult for voters 
to determine the quality or competence of each regulator for each agency because of the 
sheer number of regulators, and the fact that expertise is, by definition, difficult for 
laypersons (i.e., voters) to assess. Hence we rule out directly elected regulators as the 
normative benchmark.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 During 2013, that is, agencies reported a total of 2,803 actions in the Federal Register under the title “final 
rule”; this figure probably understates the total level of rulemaking, as agencies sometimes list the action as 
something other than a “final rule” when publishing in the Federal Register (for instance, “final action”). 
Of course, this figure masks incredible heterogeneity in the content of rules, some important, some not, 
some increasing regulatory burdens, some reducing regulatory burdens, and so on. On this last point, see, 
e.g., Carey (2015).  
4 We draw this figure of agencies with rulemaking authority from Farina (2010, 361).  
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 This then leaves two main possibilities for democratic rulemaking benchmarks, 
both of which we consider in this chapter. The first is what we refer to as “legislative 
matching” or the “representative” or “republican” (with a small “r”) benchmark.5 Under 
this approach, the relevant question is whether the rulemaking matches what would have 
been passed as a statute, if Congress had the same expertise and time that the agency used 
to develop the policy. This normative baseline focuses on examining to what extent 
delegation from the legislature to agencies distorts public policy outcomes from 
contemporaneous congressional legislative preferences.6  
A second possibility is what we refer to as “electorate matching” or the “democratic” 
(with a small “d”) benchmark. Under this approach, the relevant question is whether the 
rulemaking matches what the median voter would have done, if that representative voter 
had the same expertise and time that the agency used to develop the policy. This 
normative baseline, therefore, essentially bypasses the legislature as an intermediate 
institution, asking to what extent rulemaking outcome is consistent with the preferences 
of the voters themselves, as if expressed through a referendum where voters had the 
relevant expertise and time.  
With those normative baselines in mind, we organize this chapter around the central 
positive theories that scholars have advanced to address the democratic legitimacy of the 
administrative state. We divide the remainder of this chapter into three main parts. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We stress that the term “republicanism” refers to our representative institutions, and is quite distinct from 
notions of “civic republicanism” articulated in Seidenfeld (1992) and elsewhere.  
6 Benchmarking by the representative institution makes a certain amount of sense in the context of 
rulemaking, as it focuses on what is novel about rulemaking relative to lawmaking. Note that for most of 
the article, when we refer to “congressional” preferences, we have the Congress that is contemporaneous to 
the rulemaking in mind. One might also imagine a benchmark based on the preferences of the enacting 
legislature, and in fact when courts interpret statutes they at least formally have the enacting and not the 
current Congress in mind. Our enterprise in this chapter, however, is different from the courts’ enterprise: 
we wish to establish a normative benchmark, not develop a theory of statutory interpretation. 
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first part of the chapter (Section II) explores how governmental institutions allow the 
legislature and the president to control agencies. These institutional structures lead to 
either republican or democratic outcomes for rulemaking. The second part of the chapter 
(Section III) explores how procedures within the agencies affect the ability of political 
principals to achieve republican or democratic outcomes. The final section of the chapter 
(Section IV) identifies shortcomings in the literature and suggests paths for future 
research. 
The overall conclusion from this chapter and the literature is that no existing theory of 
democratic rulemaking predominates; they all suffer from serious conceptual and 
empirical faults. In this environment, there are many promising paths for future research 
by academics to fill gaps in the literature. 
 
II. Institutions and Democratic Rulemaking 
 A. What Institutional Structures? 
 Institutional structures establish certain core rights and responsibilities of actors in 
the administrative policy-making process. Often, though not always, these roles derive 
from interpretations of the Constitution. For example, one critical set of structures relates 
to control over administrative personnel. At least the boundaries of the question of who 
controls the appointment and removal of officers, and in what contexts, largely turn on 
one’s interpretation of the Constitution. Likewise, control over agency budgets is one 
important structure that influences regulatory policymaking, and congressional 
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preeminence in this area is rooted in the Constitution.7 Other times, working within 
permissible constitutional boundaries, institutional structures emerge through statute or 
executive order. The most notable structure in this regard is the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, within the Office of Management and Budget, which gives the 
President the capacity to audit the rulemaking efforts of many agencies.8  
 
 B. Executive Agencies and Presidential Control 
 An influential theory holds that rulemaking is “democratic” by virtue of the 
President, an individual who is envisioned both to control agencies and to be electorally 
accountable for agency actions (Hamilton, Federalist 70; Prakash 1991). This perspective, 
often alloyed to the so-called “unitary executive” theory, advocates for the concentration 
of administrative authority in the hands of the president, as doing so renders it plain who 
is responsible for regulatory actions, and provides voters the channel of presidential 
elections to discipline those actions. 
 The notion that concentrating authority and, runs the theory, responsibility in the 
hands of a single individual is historically well pedigreed. Attacking proposals for a 
“plural” executive consisting of several individuals, Alexander Hamilton wrote in 
Federalist 70 that, “one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive . . . is 
that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.” In the event of 
maladministration under a plural executive, he continued, blame “is shifted from one to 
another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
8 OIRA influence over independent agencies is limited. 
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opinion is left in suspense about the real author.” By placing administrative authority in 
the hands of a single individual—the president—the public will readily understand the 
author of any “pernicious measure,” and then may use elections to punish him for these 
actions. 
Though the history remains contested, courts have often construed the 
Constitution in ways sympathetic to this theoretical perspective, giving the President the 
preeminent role in administrative personnel decisions.9 Prominently, it is the President 
who makes the appointments of principal officers to agency positions, with only the 
“advice and consent” of the Senate.10 And, as interpreted by the courts, the President 
likewise generally enjoys a dominant position in the removal of such officers.11 Over time, 
the President has developed additional tools and structures of control. Most importantly, 
the President, with help from Congress, created in 1980 the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which allows the President to audit agencies rulemaking 
efforts (Bubb and Warren 2014). But Presidents have also developed and amplified other 
tools. For example, they have burrowed their political appointees deeper into the agencies 
through non-confirmed and Schedule C appointments. (Lewis 2008). 
 Although this presidential domination perspective promises an elegant mechanism 
to impose democratic disciplining on rulemaking, we have several reasons to be skeptical. 
Perhaps most centrally, this perspective relies on presidential elections to endow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This chapter is not the place to chronicle the many nuances of doctrine in this area of U.S. constitutional 
law, but it is still important to note at least that the President’s control over personnel is more limited in 
independent agencies, see, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
10 Note that much turns on whether the appointment refers to an inferior or principal officer. For a case 
illustrating this fault line, consider Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
11 Of course, there is no “Removals Clause” of the Constitution; for an early and still-influential 
interpretation on removal, see Myers v. United States (1926).   
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rulemaking with democratic credentials. However, presidential elections may be poor 
institutions through which to discipline regulatory behavior. 
Besley and Coate (2003, 2008) observe that elections force voters to choose 
among “bundles” consisting of a potentially wide array of policy and regulatory 
commitments. The fact that voters only choose among bundles, they show, implies that 
politicians may adopt non-majoritarian positions on some issues. As Berry and Gersen 
(2008) and Gersen (2010) argue, this result diminishes some force from the notion that 
presidential domination of rulemaking necessarily produces “democratic” rules in the 
relevant sense. Rather, the fact that voters select only among bundles of policies suggests 
that the president enjoys wide discretion to adopt non-majoritarian positions on many 
regulatory policies.  
A second criticism is that it seems unlikely that voters can process the information 
necessary to hold the president accountable for regulatory choices (e.g., Farina 2010, 
Mendelson 2008), even if the institutional limitations above did not apply or applied only 
at the margins. The most rudimentary legal distinctions—the difference between a statute 
and a regulation—elude even highly motivated citizens (Cuellar 2005), indicating they 
would have difficulty separating congressional from executive work product.12 These 
considerations suggest that presidential elections most likely serve as poor institutions for 
delivering “democratic” rulemaking.13 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 We discuss this point further in part III.B, where we engage with the deliberative potential of the 
rulemaking process.  
13 Another virtue of so concentrating authority, according to proponents, is that the president is the only 
individual that all citizens vote for. So being, goes the notion, the president is less prone to parochialism 
and other pathologies that afflict other representative entities. As Woodrow Wilson put it, “[t]he nation as a 
whole has chosen him . . . he is the representative of no constituency, but of the whole people . . . he speaks 
for no special interest” (Wilson 1885). These national credentials, unique to the president, elevate the 
“democratic” status of his regulations, pulling regulatory outcomes toward voter preferences and away 	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 A third class of criticisms questions the ability of the president to control the 
bureaucracy—questions, that is, the fundamental premise, as a positive matter, of 
executive domination.  
 The seed of this class of criticisms is implicit in the long-standing debate over 
who controls administrative agencies (e.g., Weingast and Moran 1983; Weingast 1984; 
Hammond and Knott 1996; Clinton, Lewis and Selin 2014), an inquiry that only makes 
sense in the context of factually ambiguous control over agencies. But more recently, 
scholars have begun to generate data directly pertaining to the executive domination 
thesis. One set of scholars, for instance, surveyed agency officials, and they reported 
“sporadic” rather than systematic control by the White House over regulatory matters 
(Bressman and Vandenbergh 2006). Another recent study surveyed agency officials, 
asking, “In general, how much influence do the following groups have over policy 
decisions in your agency?”, then listing, among other entities, “congressional committees” 
and the “White House.” In a seeming direct refutation of the executive domination thesis, 
the average response by officials appears to lie between 0 and 1 on a scale between “-4” 
and “4”, with “-4” representing complete congressional (committee) domination, and “4” 
representing suggesting complete White House domination (Clinton, Lewis and Selin 
2014). All of this suggests that, in general, control over agencies is as a practical matter 
shared by Congress and the President. Based on the views of agency officials, the White 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from those of special interests. However, the coalitions that elect a president represent something less than 
the “nation as a whole.” The Electoral College provides presidential candidates with an incentive to pursue 
a coalition consisting of a fraction of the voters, plausibly less than a majority, and in this sense presidential 
elections engender the same type of parochialism associated in Congress (Nzelibe 2005). Thus, in this view, 
elections introduce a certain form of disciplining of regulatory behavior, but quite plausibly induce 
accountability to some sub-coalition of voters rather than to the median of the electorate, much less to the 
“nation as a whole.” 
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House does not dominate policymaking to the exclusion of Congress. Even as the 
president asserts his interests through OIRA review and other means (Kagan 2001, 
Croley 2003), Congress retains many tools of bureaucratic influence, and agencies retain 
their own policy agendas and means of evading executive oversight (Nou 2013).14 
  
 C. Temporal Considerations and the Role of Independent Agencies 
 As has long been argued, constitutions represent a technology to allow us to bind 
our selves to a certain course of action, a form of democratic action “by the body 
politic . . . to protect itself against its own predictable tendency to make unwise decisions” 
(Elster 2000, 88).15 Following this notion, the U.S. Constitution contains many elements 
designed to resist responsiveness to transitory shifts in majority preferences: for example, 
a challenging amendment procedure; a core separation of powers structure; and a 
bicameral legislature, with the Senate acting as “an anchor against popular fluctuations” 
(Madison, Federalist No. 63). As many constitutions both embrace democratic ideals and 
resist popular impulses, so might administrative rulemaking. Most theories of 
“democratic” rulemaking, however, neglect this temporal aspect of preferences, so 
central to the study of constitutionalism (but see below; Majone 1996, 1997).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This feature of “shared” powers of administration is deeply embedded in the structure of the American 
Constitution (e.g., Fisher 1998). The framers designed a system, which though termed a “separation” of 
powers system, in fact fostered near-constant interaction and contestation between the branches over shared 
areas of control. Congress routinely attempts to influence regulatory policymaking by using a wide range of 
tools: oversight hearings and the subpoena power (e.g., Aberbach 1990), appropriations (e.g., Stiglitz 
2014b), influence over appointments (e.g., McCarty 2004), and so on. These tools tend to confine and 
condition executive discretion with respect to regulatory policymaking, and in this way undermine the core 
premises of the executive domination thesis. Given this fundamental constitutional structure of separated 
yet still shared powers, the idealized vision of this executive domination thesis is probably unlikely to be 
realized, through judicial decisions or other means (Stiglitz 2014a). 
15 More colorfully, the New Jersey politician John Potter Stockton, who resisted post civil war amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, said, “Constitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in their sane 
moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in the day of their frenzy,” quoted in Elster (2000, 89).  
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 The basic notion of time inconsistency is that the preferences of an individual or 
institution may change over time. A major source of inconsistency derives from the fact 
that the individual or group that controls policy at time period t may not control it at time 
period t+1. For example, the dominant coalition in the legislature that passes a policy at 
time t may subsequently lose an election, and the identity of the dominant coalition shifts 
at time t+1 (Shepsle and Horn 1989).16 Or, classically, a legislature’s preferences over 
actions may change once another actor takes some action, such as a decision to set wage 
levels or make an investment (e.g., Rogoff 1985).  
Although the general notion of time inconsistency in preferences is not foreign to 
the study of administrative action, its role in democratic rulemaking is perhaps 
understudied. Scholars have long recognized that designing administrative agencies 
precisely to thwart majority impulses potentially enhances citizen welfare (e.g., Kydland 
and Prescott 1977; Rogoff 1985; Dixit 1996). Such studies, however, tend to concentrate 
on monetary policy, understanding the delegation of that policy to “independent” central 
banks as a way of committing to a policy of low inflation and defeating the problem of 
dynamic inconsistency in preferences (Rogoff 1985). There, the problem is that the 
legislature cannot commit to a policy of low-inflation. The solution, in the standard 
account, is to delegate monetary policy authority to an independent agency with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Temporal inconsistencies may also arise when a new group or coalition gains predominant control over 
the agency following delegation. One common concern, for instance, is that the regulated entities will 
“capture” the administrative agency, following the desires of the regulated entities by adopting lax 
regulatory standards (Kwak 2013) or, classically, erecting barriers to entry for potential competitors (Stigler 
1971). This also is a form of temporal inconsistency, in the sense that the regulated industries, rather than 
the legislature, controls agency behavior post-delegation. Of course, one way in which this might not 
represent such an inconsistency is if the legislature delegated just so that the agency might be captured. 
Although we do not want to dismiss this as a relevant possibility, we want to focus on the cases in which 
the legislature is not so captured and the agency might be; such instances, prevalent in our view, reflect 
inconsistency in preferences in the relevant sense. 
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ability to so commit. This is the more or less conventional account for central bank 
independence (e.g., Drazen 2004), but the same logic might apply any time that the 
legislature wishes to commit to a course of action when otherwise faced with incentives 
to renege in some fashion. For instance, after inducing third parties to invest in costly 
infrastructure, such as railroads or communications networks, the government often faces 
an incentive to expropriate through “low-ball” ratemaking or other regulatory means. 
This is one plausible understanding of why many agencies with jurisdictions over policy 
areas requiring heavy investment, such as communications (FCC) or, in an earlier era, 
railroads (ICC) often have institutional features promoting autonomy from the political 
branches. By delegating policy authority to independent agencies, the legislature is able 
to induce investment that otherwise would wither in recognition of the legislature’s 
inability to commit to not expropriate. Thus, as in the classic story of Ulysses and the 
sirens, in a range of policy areas, agency independence arguably serves to protect the 
legislature from itself.  
Thus, what the constitution accomplishes through the separation of powers, 
bicameralism, and other devices, the administrative state might accomplish by structuring 
administrative agencies to be insulated from the political principals, centrally the 
President.17 This is achieved, in the standard account, through various structures. For 
example, making officers of the agencies removable only “for cause,” rather than “at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It is worth noting, however, that on one view agency “independence” principally serves to insulate 
agencies from presidential influence—not “politics” or congressional influence—and that as a result, 
Justice Scalia notes, executive control is “simply . . . replaced by increased subservience to congressional 
direction,” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). If all that is achieved by making 
an agency independent is that executive influence is displaced in favor of congressional influence, it is 
unlikely that many of the benefits we discuss in this part will be realized.  
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will,”18 but also, for example, by creating agencies with boards rather than a single head, 
staggering the terms of such members, and providing means of self-financing, as through 
licensing fees or other assessments, to the agency (e.g., Barkow 2010).19  
 Providing agencies with “autonomy” or “independence” is likewise one response 
to the problem of the enabling legislature not controlling agency policy in the future. Moe 
(1990) and de Figueiredo (2002), for example, observe that due to electoral uncertainty, 
today’s legislative winners may be tomorrow’s legislative losers, providing the 
legislature with an incentive to delegate policymaking authority to an “insulated” or 
independent bureaucracy. Barkow (2010), similarly, argues that one response to the 
problem of agency capture—in one interpretation, a source of inconsistent preferences—
might be to insulate the bureaucracy from political and special interest pressure. 
More recently, scholars have focused on another implication of the legislature’s 
inability to commit: the development of agency expertise.20 This literature begins with the 
premise that the agency has the time and ability to develop expertise, but that doing so is 
costly; the legislature either cannot develop this expertise, or it is much more costly to do 
so. This difference drives the legislature to delegate policymaking authority to the agency. 
However, the agency is concerned that the legislature will “expropriate” the expertise for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For the seminal case on this point, casting such political insulation as constitutional, see Humprey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).  
19 The Federal Reserve is the most commonly noted self-funding agency, but many other agencies, often 
regulating the financial sector, have mechanisms of self-funding (see Barkow 2010). Fed funding is 
somewhat unique in that it has the ability to earn interest on government bonds bought using money it 
introduces into the system, apparently the agency’s main source of funding. See 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm.  
20 Note that the notion that agents’ incentives to collect information are sensitive to the degree of 
independence from the principal is familiar to students of legislative politics, where “independence” 
derives from restrictions on floor amendments to committee legislative proposals (Gilligan and Krehbiel 
1987). For an excellent assessment of the literature on administrative law and endogenous information 
acquisition, see Stephenson (2011).  
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its own ends, and this discourages agency investment in expertise, as in the more general 
story above.21 Along these lines, Gailmard and Patty (2007) show that an agency’s 
expertise is sensitive to the level of policy discretion conferred on the agency by the 
legislature. Cameron, de Figueiredo, and Lewis (2014, 2015) develop integrated models 
of agency expertise based on specificity of skills, political control, and discretion and 
show how both shirking and turnover in agencies occurs when there is an inability of 
politicians to commit to following the advice of expert bureaucrats. Bubb and Warren 
(2014) study the optimal level of agency bias and policy review, as through OIRA, in the 
context of endogenous information acquisition.  
 In many cases, independent or politically “insulated” agencies should be viewed 
as advancing democratic objectives. This is plain when agency independence is 
understood as a response to the possibility of agency capture by special interests. But it 
should also be understood as advancing democratic values even when independence 
protects one democratically elected coalition against another democratically elected 
coalition, or when independence protects the legislature from itself. This follows from the 
fact that independence enlarges the scope of public policy problems that the legislature 
can competently address.22 Without these forms of constraint we might not be able 
effectively to pursue objectives sought by many voters: low inflation monetary policy, for 
example, or agencies that develop expertise in their policy domains. Depending on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 One move in response to this problem is to reconceptualize information so as to not be fully 
expropriatable (Callender 2008; Hirsch and Shotts 2012). 
22 Another rationale for insulating decision-making from political accountability focuses on information 
asymmetries between voters and politicians; in this context, mechanisms of accountability can induce 
politicians to knowingly adopt inferior policies in an attempt to appear competent or otherwise congruent 
with citizens. For an excellent overview of this perspective, see Gersen and Stephenson (2014).   
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context, these structures might promote either, in our terms, democratic or republican 
outcomes.  
 
III. Procedures 
A.  What Procedures? 
Procedures are similar to institutional structures in that they establish the rights 
and privileges of actors in policy-making; they differ primarily in that they derive almost 
exclusively from statute or executive order.23 In the United States, administrative 
procedures come from three main sources:  the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 
1946 which provides the framework for rulemaking procedures and subsequent judicial 
review; the enabling or organic statute governing the functioning of a particular agency; 
and other general legislation that covers specific procedures across most or all agencies, 
such as the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 or the National Environmental Protection 
Act (Bressman 2007).24 The procedures contained in these sources—importantly, often as 
glossed by courts—determine the role of individuals and interest groups in regulatory 
proceedings and govern the manner of information exchange and required steps before a 
rule can gain the force of law.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The Due Process Clause provides some constitutional boundaries on administrative procedures, but such 
constraints apply for the most part in the adjudicatory context, which is not our focus in this article. 
24 For a discussion of international administrative procedures, see Jensen and McGrath (2011). 
25 For example, as discussed below, section 553 of the APA calls for agencies to publish notice of proposed 
rulemakings (NPRM) in the Federal Register, to allow interested parties to submit their views on the 
proposal, and to publish the rule 30 days before it is to take effect (APA § 4, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553). 
The general procedures set forth in the APA have been refined and supplemented over the years by the 
agencies themselves and by the courts (see generally Breyer et al 2011). One can find agency-generated 
procedures in the Code for Federal Regulation (CFR) as well as other agency specific documents. Judges, 
of course, also effectively impose procedures on agencies. See, e.g., Bressman 2007). A full discussion of 
court-imposed procedures is beyond the scope of this article. 
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 Most often, agencies make policy through rulemakings or adjudications, along 
with the much discussed and legally ambiguous “guidance” documents (e.g., Magill 2004, 
Epstein 2015).26 Our focus is on rulemakings. In highly stylized form, a prototypical 
rulemaking emerges from the following procedures.27 First, the agency publishes a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register. The NPRM, in principle, sets 
out at least the basic substance the proposed rule,28 along with the statutory authority for 
the rulemaking. Following notice, interested parties may submit comments on the 
proposed rule, explaining their support of or opposition to its various provisions. The 
agency then “after consideration of the relevant matter presented,” (5 U.S.C. § 553(c)) 
may drop the rule, or more likely revise it as necessary and publish the final rule in the 
Federal Register. The rule becomes legally binding no sooner than 30 days after it is 
published in final form (5 U.S.C. § 553(d)).   
 
B. Deliberative Democracy:  Procedures as Achieving Democratic Outcomes  
 In a core innovation to rulemaking procedures, the Administrative Procedures 
Act sought to enhance public participation during the development of agency rules.29 The 
APA codified procedures that endow the rulemaking process with elements of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 An agency “guidance” is an informal statement by the agency that purports to interpret or explain another 
legally binding rule. The fear is that these statements, in effect, create new rules rather than interpret or 
explain existing ones.  
27 These procedures derive from Section 553 of the APA. Note that for the purposes of this part, we abstract 
from the important role of OIRA in rulemaking, which we discuss above.  
28 A significant debate surrounds how detailed the notice of proposed rulemaking must be. See, e.g., Nou 
and Stiglitz (2016).  
29 In one account of the APA’s history, the “bill’s notice and comment rulemaking balanced the interests of 
agencies in speed and efficiency and the interests of the public in participating in the rulemaking process … 
it required agencies to solicit and consider public comment on the rules … it [was] the most important 
change that the APA impose[d] on [then-prevailing] agency practice” (Shepherd 1996, 1557). See 
McNollgast (1999); Shapiro (1986); Strauss (1996) for further discussions of the history of the APA. 
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deliberation, and scholars have long argued that participatory procedures confer 
legitimacy and various other benefits.30  Most notably, the notice and comment 
procedures promote a type of democratic dialogue between government agency and 
regulated entities (Seidenfeld 1992; Carlitz and Gunn, 2002), which arguably improves 
policy decisions, for example by enhancing assessments about the cost-effectiveness of 
rules (Gailmard and Patty 2013; Brandon and Carlitz 2002; Coglianese 2001).  
Recent advances in rulemaking technology have inspired fresh interest in this 
deliberative rationale for rulemaking. By fusing the traditional rulemaking process to the 
Internet and related information technologies, some see the “potential to enlarge 
significantly a genuine public sphere in which individual citizens participate directly to 
help make government decisions” (Shane 2004). Under the view that lowered costs of 
participation may induce citizens to participate in the rulemaking process (Stanley and 
Weare 2004; Schlossberg et al 2007), agencies have experimented with various methods 
to facilitate deliberations, including discussion groups, blogs, and real-time response 
capabilities (de Figueiredo 2006; Farina 2011). 
 The case for deliberative democracy and rulemaking is roughly as follows. To the 
extent that individuals are involved in a deliberative democratic rulemaking process—
with their voices heard and reflected in regulations—regulatory policy outcomes may be 
close to the well-informed, well-considered median voter’s preferences. Under the 
optimistic versions of this approach, “deliberative” democracy may in fact be better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For example, such procedures increase bureaucratic legitimacy (Cramton 1972) and federal government 
credibility (Beierle 2004), strengthens individual autonomy and rights of self-governance (Noveck 2010), 
increases public understanding of rulemaking (Coglianese 2001), and enhances the accountability of 
administrative agencies to other branches of government (Coglianese). For a more complete review of the 
literature on participative democracy, with coverage of the public law, see Thompson (2008); Chambers 
(2003); and Ryfe (2005). 
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served through rulemaking than other methods of policymaking, such as legislation. After 
all, the rulemaking process structures decisions to ensure at least some minimum level of 
engagement and rational discussion between the government and the public—a 
characteristic often absent from the legislative process. Moreover, unlike legislation, 
citizens can argue that a court should set a regulation aside because the agency failed to 
adequately respond to adverse arguments presented in public comments; courts routinely 
do so. In this sense, rulemaking by agencies may be the “best hope” of realizing 
“deliberative decision-making informed by the values of the entire polity” (Seidenfeld 
1992).  
While the deliberative democracy argument has gained some traction in the 
academic literature over the past two decades, we also have reasons for pause. First, 
agencies have frequently determined the content of the rules and regulations before they 
issue the NPRM (Wagner et al 2011; Farber and O’Connell 2015; Nou and Stiglitz 2016). 
By the time open public deliberation supposedly transpires, agencies have, under a 
common view, largely determined the policy outcome through private, closed-door 
meetings (Kerwin and Furlong 2011). Moreover, not only are the meetings largely closed, 
but the set of interest groups participating in the crafting of the NPRM are highly unlikely 
to be representative of the median voter (Krasnow et al 2001; McGarity and Wagner 
2008). Indeed, it may be this opaque character of the pre-NPRM period that interest 
groups and agencies find so attractive. 
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Second, even after agencies issue the NPRM, the rulemaking process does not 
proceed along the lines of a democratic ideal.31  The meaningful public comments tend to 
come almost exclusively from a small number of highly interested groups (Cuellar 2005; 
Yackee and Yackee 2006). These seasoned interest groups are not only trying to 
influence the regulations in the agency, but they are also laying the groundwork for future 
challenges to the rules in the courts. Those individual citizens who do engage the 
comment and reply process tend to be very poorly informed, often submitting form letters 
supplied by interest groups (Cuellar 2005, Mendelson 2008); the “grass roots” interest 
groups themselves often become involved for the publicity and fundraising opportunities 
afforded by the rulemaking (Scholossberg et al 2004).  
The comments that individuals submit in response to NPRMs provide a glimpse 
into the understanding that the most engaged citizens have of regulations. One scholar, 
for example, examined the comments that individuals—as opposed to, for example, law 
firms or lobbyists—submitted for a proposed Department of Treasury rule on financial 
privacy (Cuellar 2005). He found that such individuals submitted the majority of 
comments, but that they “proved to be tremendously unsophisticated.”  Crucially, “[f]ew 
of them recognized the distinction between the regulation and the statute,” (Cuellar 2005), 
suggesting that these motivated citizens lacked even the most basic awareness necessary 
to influence regulatory policy. This rule is one rule among thousands issued during an 
administration that a fully informed voter might consider; it is difficult to read such 
accounts and remain optimistic about citizen-deliberative potential of rulemaking. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 It is important to note that the empirical results of studies of deliberative democracy are quite mixed (see 
Thompson 2008).  
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Most accounts of e-rulemaking, similarly, indicate that technology has so far not 
greatly enhanced the participatory aspects of rulemaking (de Figueiredo 2006, Mendelson 
2008). Indeed, even as technology lowers the cost of mobilization and appears to increase 
the number of comments somewhat, by the same logic, the average quality of individual 
comments may decrease as uninformed and marginally interested citizens represent a 
larger share of those participating in the rulemaking. Most observers conclude that the 
vast majority of citizen comments are not helpful to agencies (Weare et al 2004; de 
Figueiredo 2006). As a result, so far, e-rulemaking does not appear to act as an effective 
counter-weight to agencies’ otherwise strong incentives to focus on the well-informed 
(but non-median) interest groups most likely to present a litigation risk.32 
Third, despite claims of transparency and disclosure through the carefully crafted 
and monitored notice and comment procedures, many of the more influential post-NPRM 
contacts occur outside of the formal notice-and-comment procedures (Kerwin and 
Furlong 2011). A parallel process in many agencies—“ex parte” procedures33—creates a 
privileged and more opaque process where considerable horse-trading occurs (de 
Figueiredo and Richter 2014; McGarity and Wagner 2008). During these ex parte 
meetings, individual interest groups gain preferential access to regulators to air their 
concerns, transfer ideas and information, and otherwise attempt to mold the regulations to 
their liking (Krasnow et al 2001). These ex parte contacts follow a predictable pattern of 
both timing and access (de Figueiredo 2005). Although agencies generally comply with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In response to these problems, researchers are seeking out innovative approaches to engage citizens 
through technology. For a promising approach, see Farina et al (2010). 
33 We use quotes to acknowledge that the APA only prohibits ex parte contacts in the context of formal 
proceedings, and that the term is often applied by analogy to informal proceedings, such as rulemakings 
under APA § 553.  
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disclosure requirements with respect to these contacts, analysis of the disclosures shows 
they reveal very little of the substance of the meetings. The disclosures, instead, generally 
report only the barest essentials: the fact the meeting occurred and the general topic or 
agenda for the meeting (de Figueiredo 2001, 2005). 
Finally, agencies often avoid the rulemaking process altogether. They might do so 
by strategically relying on other policymaking forms with different procedural 
requirements, such as adjudications (Mashaw and Harfst 1986, Magill 2004, Stiglitz 
2015c), or by channeling what amounts to policy changes into guidance documents, or 
interpretative rules, formally not legally binding instruments that regulated parties may 
nonetheless regard as effectively binding (Magill 2004, Magill and Vermule 2012, 
Epstein 2015). We note in passing that negotiated rule-making, where interested groups 
work together to foster deliberation and forge a solution that is mutually acceptable to all 
parties, may encourage negotiation and compromise. However, empirically, negotiated 
rulemaking is rarely used and is generally viewed as having limited success (Coglianese 
1997). If our best hope for deliberative democracy lies in rulemaking, all of this suggests 
the hope is nonetheless dim.  
 
C. Control:  Procedures as Achieving Legislative Outcomes 
An alternative view of administrative procedures is that their main purpose is 
to enhance congressional control of agencies, and to check the power of the bureaucracy 
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and the President (McNollgast 1987). In this sense, they reflect more a republican rather 
than democratic tone.34  
This congressional control procedural theory views agency control as a 
principal-agent problem (McNollgast 1987, 1989). The principal, Congress, must insure 
that the better-informed bureaucrats will show fidelity to the objectives of Congress in 
designing and executing policy outcomes. Rather than wait for ex post auditing to rectify 
bureaucratic deviations from congressional preferences, positive political theory argues 
that well-designed procedures statutorily imposed upon the agency will minimize the 
zone of discretion for the agency through ex ante mechanisms. When bureaucrats test the 
boundaries of discretion and drift away from congressional preferences, “fire alarms” will 
be triggered during the rule-making process ex ante (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 
Lupia and McCubbins 1994), and judicial and congressional auditing will protect the 
congress ex post.  
A number of classes of procedural mechanisms are available to Congress to 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem and control agencies (McNollgast 1987, 
1989). A first class of procedures attempts to minimize information asymmetries by 
flushing the rule into the open before it becomes finalized. Most prominently, the notice 
and comment procedures, at least in idealized form, force an agency to reveal its agenda 
before it becomes a reality, allowing interest groups and aligned congressional factions 
the opportunity to intervene, for example through oversight hearings, budgeting, or 
scrutiny of executive nominees (McNollgast 1987, 1989; de Figueiredo et al 1999). A 
second class of procedures is designed to enfranchise interest groups whose views are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 We emphasize that Congress has other tools as well—it does not only rely on procedures to control 
agencies. See, e.g., footnote 14. 
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close to the enacting Congress. For example, requiring agencies to complete 
environmental impact statements—part of the National Environmental Protection Act— 
provides a procedural avenue for groups to challenge rules on environmental grounds. In 
so doing, congress assures like-minded interest groups a place in the regulatory process; 
often this preferred position is judicially enforceable. Moreover, if the agency slights 
these voices, the favored groups may alert Congress to this fact, again allowing allied 
congressional factions to mobilize against the agency (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 
Lupia and McCubbins 1994). A third class of procedures to enhance congressional 
control slow the regulatory process so that advocates of congressional viewpoints will 
have time to mobilize and influence policy outcomes (Eskridge and Frickey 1994; 
Ferejohn and Shipan 1990). Hence, for example, procedures require adequate notice of 
proposed rules, and delay the effective dates of rules by at least 30 days. Congress 
delegates enforcement of these procedures, in large part, through the courts. For example, 
a court may set aside a rule if the agency sidesteps the notice and comment process or 
ignores arguments presented in public comments.  
Together, these procedures limit the discretion of agencies to affect policy and 
channel policy making to reflect the preferences of the enacting and/or current congress. 
This approach allows Congress to influence rulemaking cost- and time-effectively, as 
decentralized agents with similar interests commit their time and resources to monitoring 
agencies (Bressman 2007; Lupia and McCubbins 1994). Under this theory, procedures 
are designed to reflect a republican form of government—the procedures attempt to 
generate rulemaking outcomes similar to those that would obtain if Congress had the time 
and expertise to consider the issue. 
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Despite the intuitive elegance of this theory of congressional control of agencies, 
it faces a number of challenges. First, it is unclear how robust the theory is. For example, 
one rationale for notice and comment rulemaking is to enable congress to decentralize 
monitoring and delegate it to like-minded interest groups. These same interests, however, 
have preferences of their own which may cause them to untruthfully report the behavior 
of agencies to congress (Asimow 1994). A variety of asymmetric information models 
exist to describe this behavior (see Grossman and Helpman 2001, for an overview), but 
each requires special assumptions. These games generally require additional apparatus 
for existence of pure strategy equilibria, such as repeated games and reputation, 
information verification, costly entry to the game, or additional features that do not 
always map to administrative procedures.  
Second, while the McNollgast papers do admirably describe the mechanisms of 
the procedural control theory through anecdotes and examples, many academics have 
found it extremely difficult to empirically test the main tenets of theory (Huber and 
Shipan 2002).35 Do procedures, in fact, enhance fidelity of administrative actions to 
legislative intent? There is little direct evidence in support (or against) this proposition, 
and the effectiveness of administrative procedures is thus unclear.  
Third, critically, this procedures-as-control approach relies on the courts to 
interpret and enforce the procedures (Bressman 2007). Yet the courts themselves should 
be viewed as actors in this effort to control the agency. They have policy preferences over 
policy, preferences they can realize through their interpretation of procedures (Tiller 1997, 
1998; de Figueiredo 2004; Spiller and Tiller 1999). These decisions can act directly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Huber and Shipan (2002:36) have noted that the procedural theory of congressional control of the 
bureaucracy is too general and thus hard to test and difficult to refute. 
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counter to congressional preferences. Indeed, courts have effectively amended the APA 
through common law innumerable times, generally with the interests of the court (rather 
than the legislature) in mind (Bressman 2007). For example, the rise of hard look review 
induced agencies to generate considerably more comprehensive records during 
rulemaking proceedings, seemingly supporting the general purpose of the APA and 
mitigating the information asymmetries. However, in doing so the court also plausibly 
substantially raised the bar for any type of rulemaking and thus arguably crippled efforts 
to implement a variety of legislative initiatives (McGarity 1992).36 
Thus, even as administrative procedures hold promise to enhance congressional 
control of agencies (McNollgast 1987), fostering “republican” rulemaking, many 
important foundations of the perspective remain largely unsubstantiated and contested. 
 
IV. Discussion  
 To what extent is rulemaking “democratic”? How can we reconcile policymaking 
by unelected bureaucrats with our commitment to democratic principles? 37 
 Scholars have made many important contributions to our understanding of the 
possibility of democratic rulemaking. The current literature provides a rich set of 
possibilities, and we highlight four: the so-called unitary executive theory, emphasizing 
presidential control and accountability; the structure and process school of thought, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 However, note that recent research questions the extent to which such doctrinal developments, in fact, 
impaired the ability of agencies to produce rule (O’Connell 2008; Yakee and Yakee 2012; Stiglitz 2015b). 
37 Those who doubt the possibility of democratic rulemaking often argue in favor of a more robust non-
delegation doctrine, which would in principle force the legislature to develop policies itself. The debate 
over the wisdom and feasibility of this recommendation is vast and outside the scope of this article, which 
assumes the inevitability of delegation and rulemaking. For a recent entry, however, consider Stiglitz 
(2015a). 
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emphasizing congressional control; an insulation perspective, holding that the public 
interest and democratic values are often best advanced by retarding political control over 
administrative agencies; and a deliberative perspective, arguing that rulemaking is the 
“best hope” for achieving a vision of deliberative democracy. 
 We thus have a fairly rich sense of possibilities. But our sense of the plausibilities 
is less secure. And we have virtually no certainties. We believe that it is time for the 
literature of democratic rulemaking to enter a period of self-assessment, of pruning, and 
of dismissing. This means more social scientific inquiry into rulemaking: the combination 
of traditional social scientific tools, with at least a passing competence in the relevant 
institutional details and administrative law.  
 The most obvious path forward is empirical. For instance, we have little direct 
evidence on the core questions of whether institutional design of agencies, in fact, 
promotes policy outcomes consistent with presidential preferences; we have little 
evidence on whether administrative procedures promote policy outcomes consistent with 
congressional preferences. Our sense of whether rulemaking procedures, in fact, promote 
deliberative values—relative to, say, legislation—is a void. Legally and institutionally 
informed empirical studies promise to help us eliminate the most implausible theories 
currently in circulation. Moreover, the execution of more advanced empirical designs, 
such as natural experiments and field studies, hold promise. 
But theory also holds much promise. We have at present very few formal models 
that study the democratic properties of rulemaking. For example, only recently have 
scholars started to study the theoretical relationship between political control and 
agencies incentives to develop (costly) expertise (Stephenson 2011; Bubb and Warren 
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2014; Cameron et al 2014; 2015; Gailmard and Patty 2012; see Bawn 1995 for an early 
article in this tradition). These contributions sharpen our understanding of the extent to 
which the fundamental motivation for having an administrative state—expertise—might 
be in necessary tension with democratic values. However, these models do not provide 
insights on differences in the tradeoffs that presidential versus congressional control 
might pose; executive and legislative institutions use different tools of control, for 
example, which likely carry different implications for the incentives of agencies and their 
civil servants to develop expertise.  
Finally, the scholars of democratic rulemaking will likely find traction going 
forward in integrating behavioral perspectives into the legal and economic frameworks to 
understand agencies. Advances in both theoretical modeling and empirical testing of 
behavioral approaches provide a basis for understanding more deeply, and in an more 
integrated way, the decisions of regulators and the participation of individuals and 
interest groups in the democratic rulemaking process. 
  
	   27	  
 
References 
Aberbach, Joel D. 2001. Keeping a watchful eye: The politics of congressional oversight. 
 Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 
 
Asimow, Michael. 1994. “On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits:  The Problem of 
 Regulatory Costs,” Law and Contemporary Problems 57: 128-137. 
 
Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative procedures and political control of the 
 bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92, no. 03: 663-673. 
 
Barkow, Rachel E. 2010. "Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
 Design." Texas Law Review 8: 15. 
 
Bawn, Kathleen. 1994. "Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about 
 administrative procedures." American Political Science Review 89, no. 01: 
 62-73. 
 
Beierle, Thomas C. 2004. Digital Deliberation: Engaging the Public Through Online 
 Policy Dialogues, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL 
 RENEWAL THROUGH THE INTERNET 155 Peter Shane ed. 
 
Berry, Christopher R., and Jacob E. Gersen. 2008. "The unbundled executive." The 
 University of Chicago Law Review: 1385-1434. 
 
Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 2003. "Elected versus appointed regulators: Theory 
 and evidence." Journal of the European Economic Association 1, no. 5: 1176-
 1206. 
 
Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 2009. "Quarterly Journal of Political Science." 
 Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3, no. 4: 379-397. 
 
Brandon, Barbara H., and Robert D. Carlitz. 2002. "Online rulemaking and other tools for 
 strengthening our civil infrastructure." Administrative Law Review: 1421-1478. 
 
Bressman, Lisa Schultz, and Michael P. Vandenbergh. 2006. "Inside the administrative 
 state: A critical look at the practice of presidential control." Michigan Law 
 Review: 47-99. 
 
Bressman, Lisa Schultz. 2007. "Procedures as politics in administrative law." Columbia 
 Law Review: 1749-1821. 
	   28	  
Breyer, Stephen G., Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, and Michael 
 Herz. 2011. Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems Text, and 
 Cases, Seventh Edition. New York: Aspen Publishers.  
Bubb, Ryan, and Patrick L. Warren. 2014. "Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory 
 Review." The Journal of Legal Studies 43, no. 1: 95-135. 
Cameron, Charles M., John M. de Figueiredo, and David E. Lewis. 2014. “Public Sector 
 Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control 
 Tradeoff,” Princeton University Working Paper. 
 
Cameron, Charles M., John M. de Figueiredo, and David E. Lewis. 2015. “Quitting in 
 Protest: A Theory of Presidential Policy-Making and Agency Response,” 
 Princeton University Working Paper.  
 
Carey, Maeve P. 2015. Counting Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of 
 Federal Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register. Congressional Research 
 Service Report.  
 
Carlitz, Robert D., and Rosemary W. Gunn. 2002. "Online rulemaking: A step toward e-
 governance." Government Information Quarterly 19, no. 4 (2002): 389-405. 
 
Chambers, Simone. 2003. "Deliberative democratic theory." Annual review of political 
 science 6, no. 1 (2003): 307-326. 
 
Clinton, Joshua D., David E. Lewis, and Jennifer L. Selin. 2014. "Influencing the 
 bureaucracy: The irony of congressional oversight." American Journal of 
 Political Science 58, no. 2: 387-401. 
 
Cox, Gary W.  2006. "The organization of democratic legislatures." The Oxford 
 handbook of political economy: 141-61. 
 
Cramton, Roger C. 1971. "Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participation in 
 the Administrative Process, The." Georgetown Law Journal 60: 525. 
 
Coglianese, Cary, and Robert A. Kagan, eds. 2007. Regulation and regulatory processes. 
 Ashgate Publishing.  
 
Cuéllar, Mariano-Florentino. 2005. "Rethinking regulatory democracy." Administrative 
 Law Review: 411-499. 
 
de Figueiredo, John M., and Emerson H. Tiller. 2001. "The structure and conduct of 
 corporate lobbying: how firms lobby the Federal Communications Commission." 
 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 10, no. 1: 91-122. 
 
	   29	  
de Figueiredo, J. M., and J. K. Kim. 2004. “When do Firms Hire Lobbyists?  The Organization of 
 Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission,” Industrial and Corporate 
 Change 13(6): 883-900. 
 
de Figueiredo, John M. 2006. "E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal 
 Communication Commission." Duke Law Journal 55, no. 5: 969-993. 
 
de Figueiredo, John M., and Brian Richter. 2014. “Advancing the Empirical Literature in 
 Lobbying,” Annual Review of Political Science, 17: 163-185. 
 
de Figueiredo, Rui JP, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo. 1999. "An 
 informational perspective on administrative procedures." Journal of Law, 
 Economics, and Organization 15, no. 1: 283-305. 
 
de Figueiredo, Rui JP. "Electoral competition, political uncertainty, and policy 
 insulation." American Political Science Review 96, no. 2 : 321-333. 
 
Dixit, Avinash K. 1998. The making of economic policy: a transaction-cost politics 
 perspective. MIT Press. 
 
Drazen, Allan. 2004. Political economy in macro economics. Orient Blackswan.  
 
Elster, Jon. 2000. Ulysses unbound: Studies in rationality, precommitment, and 
 constraints. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ely, John Hart. 1980. Democracy and distrust: A theory of judicial review. Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press. 
 
Eskridge, William N., and Philip P. Frickey. 1994. "Foreword: Law as Equilibrium." 
 Harvard Law Review 108: 26. 
 
Farina, Cynthia R. 2010. "False Comfort & Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, 
 Information Overload & the Unitary Executive." University of Pennsylvania 
 Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 2. 
 
Farina, Cynthia R., Mary J. Newhart, Claire Cardie, and Dan Cosley. 2011. “Rulemaking 
 2.0.” University of Miami Law Review, 65: 395. 
 
Ferejohn, John, and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional influence on bureaucracy." 
 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization : 1-20. 
 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1982. "Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or 
 administrative process?." Public Choice 39, no. 1: 33-66. 
 
Fisher, Louis. 1998. The politics of shared power: Congress and the executive. No. 1. 
 Texas A&M University Press, 1998. 
 
	   30	  
Fountain, Jane E. 2003. "Prospects for improving the regulatory process using e-
 rulemaking." Communications of the ACM 46, no. 1: 43-44. 
 
Fox, Justin, and Stuart V. Jordan. 2011. "Delegation and accountability." The Journal of 
 Politics 73, no. 03: 831-844. 
 
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2007. "Slackers and zealots: Civil service, policy 
 discretion, and bureaucratic expertise." American Journal of Political Science 51, 
 no. 4: 873-889. 
 
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. "Information & Contestation: A Formal Model 
 of Notice and Comment." Unpublished Manuscript. University of California, 
 Berkeley  
 
Gersen, Jacob E. 2010. "Unbundled Powers." Virginia Law Review (2010): 301-358. 
 
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective decisionmaking and 
 standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment 
 procedures." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization: 287-335. 
Grossman, Elhanan, and Helpman. 2001. Special Interest Politics. MIT Press:  
 Cambridge. 
Hamilton, Alexander. "Federalist 70." The Federalist Papers (1982). 
 
Hammond, Thomas H., and Jack H. Knott. 1996. "Who controls the bureaucracy?: 
 Presidential power, congressional dominance, legal constraints, and bureaucratic 
 autonomy in a model of multi-institutional policy-making." Journal of Law, 
 Economics, and Organization 12, no. 1: 119-166. 
 
Holburn, Guy LF, and Pablo T. Spiller. 2002. "Interest group representation in 
 administrative  institutions: The impact of consumer advocates and elected 
 commissioners on regulatory policy in the United States." University of California 
 Energy Institute. 
 
Horn, Murray J., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. "Commentary on" Administrative 
 arrangements and the political control of agencies": Administrative process and 
 organizational form as legislative responses to agency costs." Virginia Law 
 Review: 499-508. 
 
Howell, William G. 2013. Thinking about the Presidency: The Primacy of Power. 
 Princeton University Press. 
 
Howell, William G., and David E. Lewis. 2002. "Agencies by presidential design." 
 Journal of Politics 64, no. 4 (2002): 1095-1114. 
	   31	  
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion?  The Institutional 
 Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jensen, Christian B., and Robert J. McGrath. 2011. "Making Rules about Rulemaking A 
 Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems." Political Research 
 Quarterly 64, no. 3: 656-667. 
Krasnow, Erwin G., David R. Sidall and Michael D. Berg. 2001. FCC Lobbying: A 
 Handbook of Insider Tips and Practical Advice. New York: Aspen Publishers. 
Kwak, James. 2013. "Cultural capture and the financial crisis." Preventing Regulatory 
 Capture: 71-98. 
 
Kydland, Finn E., and Edward C. Prescott. 1977. "Rules rather than discretion: The 
 inconsistency of optimal plans." The Journal of Political Economy: 473-491. 
Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. “Designing Bureaucratic 
 Accountability,” Law and Contemporary Problems 57:91-126. 
Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. “Learning from Oversight:  Fire 
 Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed,” Journal of Law, Economics, and 
 Organization 10: 96-107 
Madison, James. "Federalist No. 63." Hamilton, Madison, Jay, The Federalist Papers 
 (1788): 387-388. 
 
Majone, Giandomenico. 1996. Temporal consistency and policy credibility: why 
 democracies need non-majoritarian institutions. European University Institute, 
 1996. 
 
Majone, Giandomenico. 1997. "From the positive to the regulatory state: causes and 
 consequences of changes in the mode of governance." Journal of public policy 17, 
 no. 02 (1997): 139-167. 
 
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional oversight 
 overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms." American Journal of Political 
 Science (1984): 165-179. 
  
McGarity, Thomas O. 1992.  Some thoughts on deossifying the administrative law 
 process.  Duke Law Journal, 1358. 
 
McGarity, Thomas O., and Wendy Elizabeth Wagner. 2008. Bending science: How 
 special interests corrupt public health research. Harvard University Press, 2008. 
 
Magill, M. Elizabeth. 2004. "Agency Choice of Policymaking Form." The University of 
 Chicago Law Review: 1383-1447. 
	   32	  
 
Magill, Elizabeth. 2009. "Standing for the Public: A Lost History." Virginia Law Review: 
 1131-1199. 
 
Magill, Elizabeth, and Adrian Vermeule. 2011. "Allocating Power Within Agencies." The 
 Yale Law Journal (2011): 1032-1083. 
 
Mashaw, Jerry L., and David L. Harfst. 1986. "Regulation and legal culture: the case of 
 motor vehicle safety." Yale J. on Reg. 4 : 257. 
 
McCarty, Nolan. 2004. "The appointments dilemma." American Journal of Political 
 Science 48, no. 3: 413-428. 
 
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1999. "The political 
 origins of the administrative procedure act." Journal of Law, Economics, and 
 Organization 15, no. 1 
 
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative 
 procedures as instruments of political control." Journal of Law, Economics, & 
 Organization: 243-277. 
 
McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Structure and 
 process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control 
 of agencies." Virginia Law Review: 431-482. 
 
Mendelson, Nina A. 2011. "Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-
 Mail." George Washington Law Review 79 : 101. 
 
Moe, Terry M. 1990. "Political institutions: The neglected side of the story." Journal of 
 Law, Economics, & Organization: 213-253. 
 
Nzelibe, Jide. 2006. "The Fable of the Nationalist President and Parochial Congress." 
 UCLA Law Review 53. 
 
Nou, Jennifer. 2013. "Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review." Harvard Law 
 Review 126: 1755-2479. 
 
Nou, Jennifer and Edward H. Stiglitz. 2016, forthcoming. “Strategic Rulemaking 
 Disclosure.” Southern California Law Review.  
 
O'Connell, Anne Joseph. 2008. "Political cycles of rulemaking: An empirical portrait of 
 the modern administrative state." Virginia Law Review: 889-986. 
 
Pierce Jr, Richard J. 2011. "Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the 
 Ossification Thesis." George Washington Law Review 80: 1493. 
 
	   33	  
Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985. "The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary 
 target." The quarterly journal of economics: 1169-1189. 
 
Ryfe, David M. 2005. "Does deliberative democracy work?" Annual Review of Political 
 Science. 8: 49-71. 
 
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1992. "Bureaucratic drift, coalitional drift, and time consistency: A 
 comment on Macey." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization: 111-118. 
 
Schlosberg, David, Stephen Zavestoski, and Stuart W. Shulman. 2007. “Democracy and 
 E-Rulemaking: Web-Based Technologies, Participation, and the Potential for 
 Deliberation,”  Journal of Information Technology and Politics, 4(1): 37-55 
 
Schoenbrod, David. 2008. Power without responsibility: How Congress abuses the 
 people through delegation. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Shulman, Stuart W., David Schlosberg, Steve Zavestoski, and David Courard-Hauri. 
 2003. "Electronic Rulemaking A Public Participation Research Agenda for the 
 Social Sciences." Social Science Computer Review 21, no. 2 : 162-178. 
 
Shapiro, Martin. 1986. "APA: Past, Present, Future." Virginia Law Review: 447-492. 
 
Seidenfeld, Mark. 1992. "A civic republican justification for the bureaucratic state." 
 Harvard Law Review: 1511-1576. 
 
Spiller, Pablo, and Emerson Tiller. 1997.  “Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of 
 Administrative Processes and Judicial Review,” Journal of Legal Studies, 26 (2): 
 347-370. 
 
Stanley, J. Woody, and Christopher Weare. 2004. "The Effects of Internet Use on 
 Political Participation Evidence From an Agency Online Discussion Forum." 
 Administration & Society 36, no. 5: 503-527. 
 
Stephenson, Matthew C. 2011. "Information acquisition and institutional design." 
 Harvard Law Review: 1422-1483. 
 
Stigler, George J. 1971. "The theory of economic regulation." The Bell journal of 
 economics and management science: 3-21. 
 
Stiglitz, Edward H. 2014a. "Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking-a Normatively 
 Informative Assessment." NYU J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 17: 137. 
 
Stiglitz, Edward H. 2014b. "Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability." Cornell L. 
 Rev. 99: 1133. 
 
	   34	  
Stiglitz, Edward H. 2015a. “The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Legislative Predicates 
 of Political Accountability.” Typescript: Cornell University. 
 
Stiglitz, Edward H. 2015b. “The Reformation of Administrative Law and Agency 
 Ossification.” Typescript: Cornell University. 
 
Stiglitz, Edward H. 2015c. “Choice of Policymaking Form, Overseer Competence, and 
 Agency Obfuscation.” Typescript: Cornell University. 
 
Strauss, Peter L. 1996. "Changing Times: The APA at Fifty." The University of Chicago 
 Law Review: 1389-1422. 
 
Thompson, Dennis F. 2008. "Deliberative democratic theory and empirical political 
 science." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11: 497-520. 
 
Wagner, Wendy, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters. 2011. "Rulemaking in the Shade: An 
 Empirical Study of EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards." Administrative Law 
 Review: 99-158. 
 
Weare, C., with Musso, J., & Stanley, W., 2004. “Participation, Deliberative Democracy, 
 and the Internet: Lessons from a National Forum on Commercial Vehicle Safety”; 
 in P. Shane (Ed.), Democracy Online: The Prospects for Democratic Renewal 
 through the Internet.; 2004. 
 
Weingast, Barry R., and Mark J. Moran. 1983. "Bureaucratic discretion or congressional 
 control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." The 
 Journal of Political Economy (1983): 765-800. 
 
Weingast, Barry R. 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent 
 perspective (with applications to the SEC)." Public Choice 44, no. 1 (1984): 147-
 191. 
 
Wilson, Woodrow. 1885. Congressional government: A study in American politics. 
 Houghton, Mifflin. 
 
Yackee, Jason Webb, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. "A bias towards business? 
 Assessing interest group influence on the US bureaucracy." Journal of Politics 68, 
 no. 1: 128-139. 
 
Yackee, Jason Webb, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2011. "Testing the Ossification Thesis: 
 An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-
 1990." Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 80: 1414. 
 
Yoo, Christopher S., Steven G. Calabresi, and Anthony J. Colangelo. 2005. "The unitary 
 executive in the modern era, 1945-2004." Iowa Law Review 90, no. 2: 601. 
